Women's rise: a work in progress by Katharine Bradbury & Jane Katz
Looking Ahead Reaching the top in the twenty-ﬁrst century 5
L
Recent   




for highly   
educated 
women, but 
the causes of 
these changes 
are not easy   
to identify
ooking back over the last 30 years, it is impossible 
not to be impressed by the enormous revolution that 
has occurred in a relatively short time. Before 1970, 
few women held workplace positions of public power 
or authority. Only a handful had jobs in the top ranks 
of large companies, and even fewer were members 
of Congress or in Cabinet or top judicial positions. 
Women reporters worked in the newsroom, but al-
most none held positions of editorial responsibility 
at the most prestigious newspapers or appeared on 
television as anchor or even reporter on the evening 
news. Almost half of all college-educated women did 
not work, and those who did tended to be concen-
trated in nursing, elementary and secondary school 
teaching, and other traditional female occupations. 
In 1970, only 4 percent of architects, 5 percent of 
lawyers, 5 percent of veterinarians, and 10 percent of 
physicians were women. 
By the dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, this pic-
ture had changed radically. Today, women on their 
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way to the top not only have become more numerous, but they 
also have made substantial progress toward parity with men. 
Young women in college today are far more likely than before 
to choose majors in career-oriented and technical ﬁelds and 
to wait to marry and start families, as Claudia Goldin points 
out. They account for 60 percent of the bachelor’s degrees in 
biological sciences, 50 percent in business, 47 percent in math, 
and 42 percent in physical sciences. They attend and complete 
college at rates that exceed those of young men, as Kathryn 
Shaw notes. In 2004, for the ﬁrst time, women comprised more 
than 50 percent of the students admitted to the freshman class 
at Harvard College.
These changes in educational focus and attainment have been 
mirrored by shifts in the labor market. Today, almost three-
quarters of all women between the ages of 25 and 64 are in the 
labor force, and the gap with men has narrowed substantially. 
This is even more apparent for college-educated women, who 
have labor force participation rates of 80 percent. Women now 
account for about half of all managerial and professional occupa-
tions, including 22 percent of architects, 28 percent of lawyers, 
39 percent of veterinarians, and 30 percent of physicians. And 
these percentages are likely to rise as older professional workers 
(who are disproportionately male) retire. 
The last 30 years have also seen a substantial narrowing of 
the gap between what men and women earn, whether measured 
by hourly pay or annual earnings. As Joyce Jacobsen notes, 
women (and especially younger cohorts) have gained in pay 
relative to men.
For those few women who manage to make it to the very top, 
wages also appear to have converged rather substantially. In a 
study of the ﬁve highest-paid executives in 1,500 corporations, 
economists Marianne Bertrand and Kevin Hallock ﬁnd that 
women’s representation in this group nearly tripled between 
1992 and 1997 (reaching a modest 4 percent). Although these 
women earned 45 percent less than men on average, almost all 
of the difference could be accounted for by the facts that they 
were more likely to work for smaller companies (which pay less 
than big ones for the same job title); less likely to have the high-
est-paying titles (CEO, chair, president); and were younger, on 
average, with less seniority than the men. This suggests that the 
observed gap could dissipate over time as women gain experi-
ence and move into higher-paying titles at larger companies. 
Indeed, Bertrand and Hallock ﬁnd that women’s compensation 
grew relative to men’s over the ﬁve years they studied, mostly 
because women gained representation in the largest corpora-
tions. Nonetheless, the authors do not rule out the possibility of 
discrimination. And other analysts have noted that if it is more 
difﬁcult for women to achieve the very top positions, those that 
do may be even more qualiﬁed than their male counterparts. 
In that case, in the absence of pay discrimination, they actually 
should be earning more.
All of these changes in the workplace have been accompa-
nied by heartening changes in attitudes. In 1977, 74 percent of 
working men and 52 percent of working women agreed that 
“men should earn the money and women should take care of 
the home and children,” according to a study by the Families 
and Work Institute. By 1997, attitudes had shifted, particularly 
among men, with 42 percent of working men and 40 percent 
of working women agreeing with the statement. Similarly, in 
1977, only 49 percent of working men felt that an employed 
mother could “have just as good a relationship with her child 
as a mother who does not work outside the home”; by 1997, 62 
percent agreed. Working women had apparently already ﬁgured 
this out; 70 percent agreed with the statement in 1977, rising 
to 73 percent in 1997. 
Is the pace of change slowing?
Yet despite the progress, gender equality is still not a reality. 
And nowhere is this more apparent than at the very top—where 
barriers continue to be very much in evidence. As of 2004, there 
were only eight women CEOs among Fortune 500 companies 
(1.6 percent), up from two in 1992. Progress has been slow 
when compared to the perhaps optimistic predictions made 
early on in this revolution. In a 1979 survey of women ofﬁcers 
in 1,300 large companies, 30 percent expected to see 50 Fortune 
500 CEO slots held by women by 1999. Even Herman Kahn, 
founder of the conservative Hudson Institute (and reportedly a 
model for the Dr. Strangelove character in the Stanley Kubrick 
ﬁlm), predicted that women would hold 10 percent of the top 
spots by the turn of the century. 
The stubbornly slow pace of change at the top is also evi-
dent elsewhere in the economy. A recent study of top research 
departments in U.S. universities found that women’s share of 
full professorships in the sciences ranged from 3 percent in 
engineering to 15 percent in psychology, leaving the growing 
number of undergraduate women in these departments with few 
female role models. And when the three major network news 
anchors recently announced their retirement, the most likely 
replacements being mentioned in the press were all white men. 
Noted retiring NBC anchor Tom Brokaw in The New York 
Times, “I honestly thought, eight or nine years ago, that when 
we [the three anchors] left, that it would be the end of white 
male anchor time . . . . I think we are still stuck in a society that 
looks at white males as authority ﬁgures.” 
A number of statistics and indicators also show evidence of a 
slowdown in the pace of change. Women continue to increase 
their representation among college and graduate-school stu-
dents and also among undergraduates studying technical ﬁelds. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, married women with young children and high-wage husbands 
experienced the largest gains in paid employment and earnings
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However, the rise in the share of women among engineering 
B.A.s has slowed (rising from less than 1 percent in 1970 to 13 
percent in 1986, but to only 19 percent by 2002). The female 
share of computer science B.A.s has actually dropped, from 37 
percent in 1984 to less than 28 percent in 2002. 
As far back as the 1980s, women’s labor force participation 
rates began to rise more slowly; during the 1990s, the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began reporting declines for 
college-educated women with young children and for married 
women with young children. 
In addition, Jacobsen and a number of other researchers have 
noted the slowing rate at which women’s wages are converging 
with men’s. In a recent paper, Francine Blau and Lawrence 
Kahn point out that the ratio of women’s median annual earn-
ings to those of men (for year-round full-time workers) rose 9 
percentage points (reaching almost 69 percent) between 1979 
and 1989, but increased only another 3.5 percentage points by 
1999. Particularly relevant to “reaching the top,” they show 
that at the high end of the wage distribution, the gender gap 
hardly narrowed at all during the 1990s (and much less than 
during the 1980s). In addition, they ﬁnd that among the top 
10 percent of wage earners, the “unexplained” portion of the 
female-male gap (the part that can’t be assigned to factors such 
as education and age) actually increased in the 1990s. While 
this might be the result of unmeasured differences between 
top-earning women and men, it is also consistent with a glass 
ceiling. The gains women made in the 1980s may have put 
more of them into high-level positions where discrimination or 
other subtle impediments could have had an increased impact 
on their forward progress.
Not all of this evidence is necessarily cause for concern. As 
women’s share of advanced degrees or their share of jobs in a 
particular occupation approaches 50 percent, one doesn’t nec-
essarily expect to see further “improvement.” The same is true 
with labor force participation rates and other measures of labor 
force activity or success: As women approach parity with their 
male counterparts, one would expect further change to slow and 
eventually cease. Moreover, if women’s preferences are genuine-
ly different (on average) from men’s, as Nancy Folbre speculates, 
then we would not ever expect exact numerical equality across 
all ﬁelds of study and occupations. Nonetheless, the mixed pic-
ture does suggest that understanding the extent and causes of 
this slowdown is important if we are to continue improving the 
working and home lives of both women and men. 
Are professional women “opting out”? 
News accounts also have raised the question of a slowdown 
and reversal in some of the gains women have made. Stories 
in the popular press have focused on high-powered women 
who, after trying to simultaneously work in prestigious jobs 
and care for home, husband, and children, have opted out of 
the workforce—some temporarily and some for longer peri-
ods—to mind their children while their husbands continue in 
the traditional income-earning role. A prominent example is 
the cover story in The New York Times Magazine (October 24, 
2003) about “the growing number of highly educated profes-
sional women who are leaving ambitious career paths to spend 
more time with their families,” not because they can’t continue 
to achieve in the workplace, but because they choose not to. 
Another recent story in the Boston Globe (December 10, 2004), 
describes stay-at-home mothers as the new “status symbol” of a 
“privileged class.” Such stories, along with the BLS data noted 
above, have raised concerns that the pipeline for the next gen-
eration of women leaders is diminishing and that hard-won 
gains from an earlier generation are being lost.
However, determining what might be driving this behavior is 
more difﬁcult than it might appear. Economic theory suggests 
that how much any woman (or man) participates in the labor 
market depends on the interplay of several factors, including 
the wage rate she (he) can earn in paid work, other available 
sources of income, and preferences—the value placed on time 
spent caring for children and other family members, cleaning, 
preparing food, or enjoying leisure activities. A higher wage rate 
makes paid work relatively more attractive compared to unpaid 
work at home and/or leisure and will tend to raise labor market 
participation and hours. Indeed, rising real wages, increased 
personal fulﬁllment from and social acceptance of women in 
paid work, and declines in the cost of purchased substitutes for 
work at home (prepared foods, vacuum cleaners, etc.) explain 
much of the increase in women’s labor market participation in 
the twentieth century. 
Greater income from any other source, including higher 
earnings by spouses, tends to reduce an individual’s time spent 
working for pay because it allows greater consumption of both 
purchased and “homemade” goods and services. The presence 
of young children at home increases the relative value of unpaid 
work and, all else equal, should reduce labor market participa-
tion and work hours. To working parents, the cost of child care 
is equivalent to a reduction in the wage rate—for every hour 
worked, an hour of child care must be purchased. 
Yet much of the history of the past few decades seems to run 
counter to the simple predictions in the previous paragraph. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the biggest employment and earnings 
gains for married women came from the wives of high-wage 
husbands, according to research by Chinhui Juhn and Kevin 
Murphy. During this period, increased market opportunities, 
Since the mid 1990s, among college-educated women, married women with young   
children and high-earning husbands saw the sharpest participation declines
5 REACHING THE TOP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYQ1 2005 REGIONAL REVIEW 63 64 REGIONAL REVIEW Q1 2005
particularly for highly skilled women, appear to have been large 
enough—and more important than the availability of husbands’ 
earnings—to tip women’s decisions in favor of more paid work. 
In the 1980s, married women with young children markedly 
increased their involvement in the paid labor market, and at a 
faster rate than other women—perhaps because labor market 
opportunities and preferences were also changing more than 
enough to shift the balance. 
This suggests that the term “opting out” as used in the press 
is ambiguous. Decisions to work, and how much to work, al-
ways involve some balancing of the relative rewards and costs 
of working for pay, unpaid work at home, and leisure—and 
this is particularly true for those in the upper part of the income 
distribution, who tend to have a larger scope of choice. Women 
(and men) who make a decision to reduce their involvement in 
paid work presumably do so because the additional cost in terms 
of family or leisure time foregone is not worth the resulting addi-
tional salary. Attributing a reduction in labor force involvement 
to “opting out” does not tell us whether some women’s prefer-
ences changed, social norms shifted (making it more costly for 
women to work), some women’s opportunities worsened (their 
wages declined or they hit a glass ceiling), or some families 
received additional income from a booming stock market or 
higher husbands’ earnings. 
Evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
To examine these issues, we tabulated data on the labor market 
involvement over the last two decades of highly educated wom-
en and men—those with a college degree or more—of prime 
working age, deﬁned as 25 to 54 years old. Published BLS data, 
such as those cited above, focus on college-educated women 
with young children or married women with young children, 
but not both, and typically have a wider age range. 
The data we examine are useful for shedding light on “pipe-
line” issues for the upper echelons of the labor market because 
they are restricted to women with at least four years of college 
(who comprised 30 percent of women age 25 to 54 in 2004). 
Note, however, that they provide only limited insight into the 
handful of women who ultimately make it to the “very top.” 
Has labor market involvement declined for married women 
compared to divorced, separated, widowed, or never-married 
women? And among married women, are the reductions more 
pronounced for mothers with children living at home and/or 
women with higher-earning spouses? 
 We focus on labor force participation because it most clearly 
reﬂects an individual’s or family’s decision about whether or 
not to work (or seek work). We use data from all 12 monthly 
BLS surveys each year; thus, labor force participation rates are 
the fraction of women working or looking for work in an aver-
age week during the year. When calculating changes over the 
decade 1994 to 2004, we average data from 1994 and 1995 for 
beginning-of-decade participation rates and data from 2003 and 
2004 for end-of-decade rates; this reduces the impact of eco-
nomic conditions in a single year. We also look brieﬂy at other 
measures of the intensity of women’s labor market involvement, 
including the share working full time and the average weekly 
hours of full-time workers.
The analysis is complicated by a number of changes in the 
way BLS gathered information, resulting in “breaks” in the 
data in 1994 when these new procedures were implemented. 
In particular, the old procedures assumed that adult women 
were likely to be homemakers; thus, if they happened to be 
home when the BLS surveyor knocked on the door, they were 
more likely than men to be misclassiﬁed as not in the labor force 
(“keeping house”) even if they were in fact employed (work-
ing a few hours a week) or unemployed (seeking work). The 
change resulted in a small jump in some women’s measured 
labor force participation between 1993 and 1994, not because 
behavior had changed but because the revised procedures were 
more accurately classifying them. 
What do we ﬁnd? While highly educated women are much 
more likely to work in the ﬁrst place, changes over time in their 
labor force participation are similar to those of other women. The 
labor force participation rate of prime-age women with at least 
four years of college rose in the 1980s and early 1990s, leveled 
out in the mid-1990s, and then declined. Between 1994–95 
and 2003–04, the rate declined from 84.7 percent to 81.8 per-
cent—about 3 percentage points. Meanwhile, prime-age, highly 
educated men’s participation rates also declined about 1 percent-
age point, to 95 percent in 2003 and 2004. 
The decline was most pronounced for married women with 
children under the age of three, whose participation dropped 
about 8 percentage points. (Women on maternity leave under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are counted as 
employed; thus these measures understate the extent to which 
women with very young children are taking time out—and 
understate the drop if more women were taking advantage of 
its provisions as the decade wore on.) Married women with 
school-age children (6 to 17 years old) decreased their participa-
5 REACHING THE TOP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY









Women entered the workforce in large numbers over the past four
decades. However, growth in labor force participation by the most
educated women slowed starting in the mid 1980s and declined in the
late 1990s.
Percent in labor force (men and women, age 25 to 64)
Source: Current Population Survey, March supplement, 1962 to 2003
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tion after 1994, but only modestly, by 2.6 percentage points. By 
contrast, highly educated, married men with children under age 
18 at home have higher participation rates than those without 
children; their participation rates were fairly stable over the two 
decades and did not appreciably decline after 1994, while rates 
for married men without children slid by about 3 percentage 
points.
Since these data provide a snapshot at a point in time, we 
cannot tell whether mothers who are not in the labor force in 
the survey month are out for only a short period or for the lon-
ger term. But if the declines reported above reﬂect increases in 
relatively temporary exits after childbirth (beyond FMLA leave 
lengths but shorter than a year or two), one would not expect 
mothers whose youngest child is three to ﬁve years old to have 
lower participation rates and steeper declines than those with 
school-age children, which they do. 
Post-1994 declines in participation rates were somewhat 
larger among mothers with higher-earning husbands (in the 
top two-thirds of college-educated women’s husbands) than 
among those with husbands earning relatively less (in the bot-
tom third)—although the differences are not huge. However, 
mothers with the highest-earning husbands (top third) showed 
particularly steep declines during the late 1990s, with a 10-point 
drop between 1997 and 2001, after which their participation 
began to rise again. Mothers with middle- and low-earning 
husbands saw more gradual and consistent declines.
Married women without children at home also reduced their 
labor force participation after 1994 (having increased it in the 
1980s), but the decline, like the preceding rise, was more gradual 
than for those with children. At the same time, the decline in 
participation for married women was greater than for divorced, 
separated, widowed, or never-married women. Labor force par-
ticipation for the latter group held fairly steady until the early 
2000s, with the ensuing decline possibly attributable to the 
recession.
Other measures provide somewhat less evidence of reduced 
labor market involvement for highly educated women after 1994. 
The fraction of prime-age college-educated women working 
full-time rose modestly, then leveled out at nearly 83 percent, 
and fell only after 2001, perhaps the result of the recession, and 
only by a small fraction. Patterns were similar for married and 
unmarried women; only mothers of young children (under age 
three) became noticeably less likely to work full-time, and even 
then only temporarily, with the share working full time declin-
ing between 1994 and 2001 and then rising from 2001 to 2004. 
Similarly, the average weekly hours of women working full-time 
declined after 1994, but the declines were small—one-quarter to 
three-quarters of an hour—and varied only slightly with mari-
tal status or for mothers with school-age children. Mothers of 
young children cut their weekly hours slightly more—by about 
one hour per week.
While these patterns run somewhat counter to the evidence 
on labor force participation, they are not surprising. Many stud-
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tend to be less responsive to income and wages than decisions 
about whether to seek work at all. Jobs are often offered in 
relatively inﬂexible work-hour conﬁgurations set by employers, 
and many women (and men) have limited ability to vary their 
hours of work. Even during the 1970s and 1980s, when women 
were entering the labor force and nontraditional occupations in 
large numbers, the increase in the percentage working full-time 
was very modest. 
Possible explanations
With this evidence on some of the recent changes in the labor 
market behavior of highly educated women, we return to the 
question of explanations. What follows is a brief discussion of 
a number of possible factors suggested by economic theory. 
In particular, what might have changed to cause the observed 
post-1994 patterns? While a full assessment is well beyond the 
scope of this article, our goal is to move beyond the notion of 
“opting out” to consider more clearly deﬁned explanations and 
their potential implications.
Women’s wages and labor market opportunities. Women’s (and 
men’s) wages play a key role in determining their participation in 
paid work. Moreover, increases in women’s wages and market 
opportunities are frequently cited as central to the large inﬂux 
of women into paid labor in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Did something change? Blau reports that real weekly wages 
for college-educated women declined very slightly in the 1970s, 
rose more than 15 percent in the 1980s, and then grew more 
slowly—increasing at only about two-thirds the 1980s’ rate—in 
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. In our sample of prime-age, college-
educated women, real weekly earnings rose 19 percent between 
1983 and 1993 and less than 12 percent from 1994 to 2004. This 
slowdown in real wage growth might be an important reason 
for the observed drop in women’s participation. 
In addition, any slowdown in the expected trajectory of future 
wages—caused, for example, by an increase in discrimination or 
other subtle barriers—might also reduce labor market commit-
ment. On the whole, overt discrimination has declined mark-
edly over the past 40 years, and the wage convergence among 
the very top corporate earners found by Bertrand and Hallock 
conﬁrms this view. Nonetheless, Barbara Reskin persuasively 
describes the persistence of subtle forms of discrimination. And, 
as mentioned earlier, Blau and Kahn found evidence consistent 
with an increased negative impact of glass ceiling barriers at the 
high end of the wage distribution in the 1990s. 
A change in other factors that could cause women to discount 
their market wages might also have had an impact. If, for ex-
ample, the costs of child care began rising relative to women’s 
wages, women’s “net” wages would decline. Similarly, changes 
in institutional arrangements that made it more difﬁcult to bal-
ance work and family might cause women (and men) to dis-
count their wages—for example, if the length of the standard 
work week rose or hours of work became less ﬂexible. But most 
observers ﬁnd the opposite—ﬂexible work arrangements are 
spreading to more workplaces. On the other hand, as Rosanna 
Hertz notes, our society still tends to hold as an ideal the top 
executive willing to make a 24/7 commitment to her job. With 
more women moving into high-level jobs, institutions may be 
changing too slowly to keep pace, or the new arrangements may 
not apply to the very top.
Other family income. Greater increases in other sources of 
family income in the 1990s compared to the 1980s, such as hus-
bands’ earnings and the stock market, could also have been a 
factor in women’s reduced labor market involvement.
However, the weekly earnings of the husbands of the women 
in our sample increased about 12 percent in real terms between 
1983 and 1993 and rose roughly the same amount (11 percent) 
between 1994 and 2004. The decline in married women’s 
participation in the data could be caused by husbands’ faster 
earnings growth in the later period, but is not easily explained 
by the steady growth that occurred, suggesting that husbands’ 
earnings were probably not the most important contributors to 
wives’ participation declines during the 1990s. On the other 
hand, these data on wage changes are medians (half the women 
had husbands with higher earnings and half with lower), and 
provide no information about the connections between an indi-
vidual wife’s participation and her own husband’s income. For 
example, wives of high-earning husbands could be reducing 
their participation in response to above-average wage growth 
for their husbands; if this were happening to a greater degree 
post-1994, husbands’ earnings could still be an important part 
of the explanation.
Greater income from nonwage sources, such as higher stock 
market returns, could also have been a factor. Because stock 
holdings are more concentrated among high-income house-
holds (which also tend to be more educated), the 1990s boom 
would be expected to cause a decrease in college-educated 
women’s labor supply, on average. One might expect a similar 
effect on college-educated men, but this is difﬁcult to disen-
tangle from other reasons for the long-term downtrend in men’s 
participation.
Preferences and cultural norms. When economists use the 
term “preferences,” they generally are referring to the intrin-
sic tastes of the individual making the decision. In addition, 
changes in social norms—larger-scale shifts in attitudes across 
many people—can have an impact similar to the effect of dis-
crimination. A culture in which women are “supposed” to care 
for children, home, and husband imposes additional costs and 
constraints on women who would choose to work and achieve 
in the marketplace. 
Did women’s preferences or social norms change in the 1990s 
to put more value on their being at home? Changes in prefer-
ences and social norms are notoriously difﬁcult to document and 
their impacts difﬁcult to quantify. Yet, during a period when 
there are signiﬁcant shifts in gender roles, the possibility that 
changing tastes are an important factor is hard to ignore. 
Data from surveys by the Families and Work Institute sug-
gest that individual attitudes and social norms of working men 
and women, at least, continue to move in the direction of sup-
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porting women’s work. The share of working men who agreed 
that “men should earn the money and women should take care 
of the home and children” held steady at 42 percent from 1997 
to 2002, and the share who thought that an employed mother 
could have “just as good a relationship with her child” rose by 
2 percentage points (to 64 percent). For working women, the 
continuing trend away from traditional gender roles was even 
more stark, with a change in only ﬁve years of 3 percentage 
points (from 40 percent to 37 percent) on the ﬁrst question 
and 5 percentage points (from 73 percent to 78 percent) on the 
second. Moreover, younger working men and women (under 
age 30 in 2002) were less likely to hold traditional attitudes than 
older workers, which both conﬁrms the view that the tide is 
not turning and also suggests that it is unlikely to revert in the 
future. At the same time, it is also possible that it became more 
socially acceptable for college-educated women to withdraw 
from paid work in the 1990s compared to the 1980s or 1970s—a 
shift which might not be captured in these questions because 
of the way they are worded.
The characteristics of potential entrants. Another possibility is 
that the women with the highest skills and market wages joined 
the labor force during the steep run-up in participation 
rates in the 1980s, leaving the pool of potential entrants 
in the 1990s more heavily weighted toward women 
who face lower wages, have greater income from other 
sources, or who more highly value activities outside paid 
work. If this were the case, these women would be un-
likely to jump into market work at the rate of their predecessors. 
However, this is a better explanation of why rates would rise 
more slowly than of why they are declining. 
Labor market attachment and the timing of breaks. The ob-
served pattern in labor force participation might be the result 
of a shift in the timing of women’s labor force involvement over 
their lifetimes, rather than a change in the factors affecting the 
trade-off between market and nonmarket work. Delayed mar-
riage and child-bearing have meant that women typically work 
more years—and also potentially develop stronger attachments 
to the labor market—before taking time out for children. Sup-
pose that women today are taking longer breaks to care for 
children but intend to resume a heavily committed work-life 
when they do return, while their counterparts of several years 
ago took shorter breaks if they returned, but were less likely 
to return, on average. Then the recent drops in measured par-
ticipation could reﬂect a short-term adjustment to the shift in 
timing rather than a decline in women’s cumulative lifetime 
participation in the labor market.
Beyond opting out 
After rising steeply in the 1980s, college-educated women’s 
labor force participation declined during the 1990s. The de-
clines were very modest for unmarried women and for married 
women with school-age children, and small compared with 
the large increases that occurred during the 50 years following 
World War II. Overall, participation of all college-educated 
women remains high (almost 82 percent were in the labor force 
in 2004), and even higher for the subset with graduate degrees 
(almost 86 percent), although it is still less than their male 
counterparts (95 to 96 percent).
However, declines in participation were somewhat larger for 
married women and noticeably larger for mothers with young 
children or mothers whose husbands had relatively high earn-
ings. These are exactly the women—those with alternative 
sources of income or higher values of their time out of the paid 
labor market—that economic theory predicts would be most 
affected by a softening of women’s wages or an increase in im-
pediments to advancement. Yet this same sensitivity also existed 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and participation among these groups of 
women rose especially steeply during those decades. Although 
these women may have the resources to leave paid work, they 
have not consistently chosen to do so. Hence our effort to move 
beyond the notion of “opting out” and more explicitly identify 
possible reasons for the shift in outcomes in the 1990s. Although 
we provide some evidence to help sort out which factors were 
more important, additional research will be required to put to-
gether all the pieces of the puzzle. S
We still don’t know whether women’s preferences or social norms shifted, opportunities 
in the workplace worsened, or families had more income from other sources
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